# EU/EU-US Counterplan

## Answers to perm

### Now key time for Europe

#### \*\*Now key time to pressure Europe for increased role in defense – key to challenge great power environment and freeing up resources for Pacific

**Kupchan** Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations **2022**

[Charles, “NATO’s Hard Road Ahead The Greatest Threats to Alliance Unity Will Come After the Madrid Summit” Foreign Affairs Magazine June 29, 2022 <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-06-29/natos-hard-road-ahead> gdi-tm]

THE EUROPEAN PILLAR

The war in Ukraine has been a geopolitical wake-up call for Europe—and NATO should capitalize on this moment. Europe has made numerous false starts over the years at acquiring more geopolitical strength and responsibility, but this time, thanks to Russia, the effort may well yield more impressive results. Russian aggression has already prompted Europeans to make new and substantial investments in military capability. Germany has allocated 100 billion euros to upgrade its dilapidated military and has agreed to meet NATO’s benchmark of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense. Other European nations have announced sizable increases in their defense budgets. Translating these investments into war-fighting capability will take time and require coordination across national boundaries and between NATO and the EU. But these investments, and Germany’s turnaround in particular, have the potential to be a game-changer, finally endowing Europe with the greater geopolitical heft that that it needs in a world in which great-power rivalry is back. The United States should keep the pressure on its allies and work with them to take full advantage of their new readiness to shoulder greater defense burdens.

A more capable Europe will make for a stronger Atlantic partnership. Democrats and Republicans alike have long complained that NATO needs a sturdier European pillar. Whatever party is in power in Washington, the Atlantic link will be in better shape if Europe brings more geopolitical heft to the table. With Russia now threatening NATO’s eastern flank and tensions in the western Pacific also putting new demands on U.S. resources, Washington will appreciate having more European capability. And even though a renewed Russian threat will keep U.S. forces in Europe for the foreseeable future, Europe needs to be able to act on its own when necessary.

### Effective EU rebalance – decrease US reliance

#### Rebalance requires decrease reliance on US for collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security – the perm increases reliance

**Binnendijk,**  Distinguished Fellow - The Atlantic Council **and Hamilton** Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe**, 2022**

**[**Hans and Daniel, “Strategic Responsibility: Rebalancing European and trans-Atlantic defense” Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strategic-responsibility-rebalancing-european-and-trans-atlantic-defense/> GDI-TM]

Taken together, these developments underscore the need for Europe and the United States to find a new path forward. Europe’s long-standing aspiration to develop more effective ways to act militarily is now intersecting with the long-standing U.S. aspiration that Europeans shoulder more of the common burden. Stated simply, Europe has wanted autonomy without providing adequate defense resources, while the United States has wanted greater European defense contributions without diminishing NATO and U.S. political influence. Now it is time to unite these two debates and find a new balance for both.

As Europe grapples with new and complex strategic realities, it can no longer afford its excessive reliance on the United States, either for collective defense or for crisis management and cooperative security missions beyond Europe’s borders. The U.S. will have to pay increasing attention to China and limit its involvement in the wider Middle East. The United States will therefore increasingly look to European allies to shoulder more of the common burden and encourage greater contributions to security by the European Union.[8]

## CP solves

### Solves NATO Cohesion Adv

#### Strategic autonomy strengthens defense, including NATO

**Solana,** Distinguished Fellow - Foreign Policy, **2022**

[Javier, “European security after NATO’s Madrid summit” Brookings June 24, 2022https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/24/european-security-after-natos-madrid-summit/ GDI-TM]

The development of the EU’s common defense policy neither entails dividing responsibilities with regard to European security, nor pretends to substitute the vital function that NATO fulfills. The responsibilities of the organizations that form the basis of the trans-Atlantic security bond will remain the same. What matters is to assume those responsibilities with all our existing capacities.

The American commentator Walter Lippmann said that alliances are like chains: They can’t be strong with weak links. On the eve of NATO’s 2022 Madrid summit, this is the best way to describe the political challenge facing the trans-Atlantic relationship. Only the political will of Europeans and their leaders will be able to strengthen our continent’s security.

## European Strategic Responsibility/Autonomy Good

### European capacity = US focus Pacific

#### Increased European capacity necessary for Russia and to allow US focus on Pacific

**Binnendijk,**  Distinguished Fellow - The Atlantic Council **and Hamilton** Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe**, 2022**

**[**Hans and Daniel, “Strategic Responsibility: Rebalancing European and trans-Atlantic defense” Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strategic-responsibility-rebalancing-european-and-trans-atlantic-defense/> GDI-TM

While Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine has reinvigorated the Atlantic alliance, it has also deepened Europe’s strategic dependence on the United States. As North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies continue to help Ukraine beat back Russia’s assault, they must also address this important longer-term challenge of rebalancing trans-Atlantic defense. Doing so means squaring a triangle of issues: ensuring Europe’s capacity to defend itself against Russia and manage a range of additional crises, many along its southern periphery; addressing European aspirations for greater strategic autonomy; and maintaining confidence that the United States can adequately uphold its commitments in both the north Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific.[1]

Advancing greater European strategic responsibility starts by defining the concept in a way designed to strengthen the Atlantic alliance. It should focus on two military goals. First, European allies should build their conventional military capabilities to a level that would provide half of the forces and capabilities, including the strategic enablers, required for deterrence and collective defense against major-power aggression. Second, European allies should develop capabilities to conduct crisis management operations in Europe’s neighborhood without today’s heavy reliance on U.S. enablers such as strategic lift, refueling, and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR).

Meeting these two goals would allow Europe to become the first responder to most crises in its neighborhood, acting through NATO, through the EU, or through ad hoc coalitions of the willing. It would permit the United States to shift some of its forces and strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific region without any significant reduction in the capabilities needed to deter Russia.

### Strong Europe key to deter China

#### Internal link – Europe needs to contribute to global deterrence of China

**Benner,** co-founder and director of the Global Public Policy Institute **2022**

[Thorsten, “Peace Through Deterrence: Why Germany and Europe Need to Invest More to Preserve the Status Quo in the Taiwan Strait” Global Public Policy Institute, March 16 2022 <https://gppi.net/2022/03/16/peace-through-deterrence> GDI TM]

Germany and Europe have every interest to work with their allies to preserve the peaceful status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Doing so will require a clear European contribution to international efforts to deter China from using force to change the current power balance in the region. Beijing needs to know that it will face extremely high costs should it use coercion or force to realize Xi Jinping’s dream of placing Taiwan under the control of the Chinese party state. A central piece of that deterrence is military, which involves Taiwan, the US and regional allies like Japan and Australia. However, Germany and Europe have a key role to play in non-military forms of deterrence. Berlin and Brussels should signal to Beijing that they would impose the most far-reaching economic sanctions possible, including cutting China off from key technologies such as advanced semiconductors, should Beijing start an armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait. To increase the credibility of this type of deterrence, Germany and Europe will need to significantly reduce their overall economic and technological dependence on China. Doing so would have the added benefit of making Europeans much less vulnerable not only to possible Chinese counter-sanctions in the event of a war, but also to Chinese economic coercion in general.

With the possible exceptions of the UK and France, European states do not have any direct role to play in terms of militarily deterring Beijing – but Europe can play an indirect military role. With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European security order has all but crumbled. By investing in stronger military capabilities at home, European states can assume a greater share of providing security in their own increasingly dangerous neighborhood. This would allow the US to focus more on the Indo-Pacific theater despite the deterioration of the security situation in Europe. At the same time, Europeans – together with the non-European G7 states and other allies – need to ensure that Beijing learns the right lessons from the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine and the associated sanctions. It needs to be clear to Xi that his ​“Chinese dream” cannot have it all and that he faces a clear-cut choice between economic prosperity on the one hand and a forceful take-over of Taiwan on the other.

At present, Germany is far from pursuing a serious and ambitious agenda aimed at preserving peace in the Taiwan Strait. At the root of this are fundamental misconceptions that still inform the attitudes of some Berlin policymakers as well as the larger public discussion. Many in Germany still view a potential Taiwan conflict as a confrontation between the US and China in which Germany has few stakes and should therefore strive to remain neutral. Others harbor delusions that Germany and Europe should act as mediators between the US and China on Taiwan. And still more have already resigned themselves to defeatism: in the medium term, they argue, it is impossible to prevent the Chinese Communist party state from swallowing up Taiwan. After all, they argue, the island is so close to China’s mainland and cannot be defended against an increasingly powerful and determined Chinese military. Furthermore, according to this argument, the US is not a reliable protector – it would not fight for Taiwan if Beijing were to launch an attack. In this scenario, Taiwan would face the same fate as Hong Kong where the US and Europe did little to challenge Beijing’s take-over by force.

### Europe key to deter China

#### US Military deterrence of china not sufficient – Europe key to non-military component of deterrence

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[Thorsten, “Peace Through Deterrence: Why Germany and Europe Need to Invest More to Preserve the Status Quo in the Taiwan Strait” Global Public Policy Institute, March 16 2022 <https://gppi.net/2022/03/16/peace-through-deterrence> GDI TM]

Why It’s Time for Investments in Deterrence

The key to peace in the Taiwan Strait is deterring Beijing from violently changing the status quo. And for deterrence to work, it will be crucial to influence the cost-benefit calculations of the Chinese leadership. The **aim must be to persuade Beijing that Taiwan cannot be conquered ​“at an acceptable cost.”** The military component of this endeavor is the task of Taiwan, the US and their regional allies. Both Taiwan and the US still have a lot of work ahead of them to achieve success in this regard. For a long time, Taiwan has failed to invest in the right military capabilities, and the US has been losing ground militarily against China in the region in recent years. But **even a military hardening of Taiwan and a strengthening of the military capabilitie**s of the US and allies like Australia and Japan alone **would likely not convince Beijing’s leadership that the costs of an attack on Taiwan are too high.** Only if Beijing believes that the political and economic consequences of an attempt to conquer Taiwan pose a fundamental threat to the ​“Chinese dream” and the foundations of the Chinese Communist Party’s ​“great national rejuvenation” project will it refrain from attacking Taiwan. As China’s key trading partners, Germany and Europe have a central role to play in this non-military component of deterrence. The former German Ambassador to the United Nations Christoph Heusgen, who now heads the Munich Security Conference, summed up what is necessary: ​“Beijing should not delude itself about the consequences of an invasion [of Taiwan]. Our possible response should be coordinated within the European Union and clearly communicated. This is not about military intervention – there are other options for sanctions. Beijing should know that it will not be treated as leniently as it was after the Hong Kong takeover.”

### EU CP/Strategic Autonomy – solves Chinese deterrence

#### Increasing European defense capabilities contribute to deterring China – frees up US resources

**Benner,** co-founder and director of the Global Public Policy Institute **2022**

[Thorsten, “Peace Through Deterrence: Why Germany and Europe Need to Invest More to Preserve the Status Quo in the Taiwan Strait” Global Public Policy Institute, March 16 2022 <https://gppi.net/2022/03/16/peace-through-deterrence> GDI TM]

A German contribution to a non-military deterrence of Beijing is especially crucial for maintaining a peaceful status quo in the Taiwan Strait. This must also be a key element of the German Federal Foreign Office’s upcoming China strategy as well as Germany’s first-ever national security strategy, which is set to be adopted by late 2022. In military terms, Germany should not aspire to a significant role in the Indo-Pacific, except when participating in freedom of navigation operations (FONOP) and intensifying defense cooperation with other allies in the region. Instead, Berlin should focus on finally beefing up its efforts to provide security in its own increasingly troubled neighborhood. **Increasing European defense capabilities would also be an important contribution to deterring Beijing.** Observers have noted that the US cannot fight a war on two fronts in both Europe and Asia – one against Russia and one against China. If Europeans can more effectively provide conventional and eventually also nuclear deterrence in their own region, the US can focus its efforts on the Indo-Pacific theater. And the more the US can concentrate on the Indo-Pacific, the more credible its military deterrence vis-à-vis Beijing becomes. Europe and the US need to prepare for the scenario of a possible two-front war in which Russia challenges NATO in Europe (or helps China by engaging Japan in the Indo-Pacific) while Beijing launches an assault on Taiwan. Brussels and Washington also need to coordinate on how to respond to any coercive measures short of war that Beijing can – and will – use to put pressure on Taiwan.

## NATO unity net benefit

### Lack of European strategic autonomy undermines unity

#### NATO – Ukraine invasion increase unity lack of European leadership in crisis sow discord

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**[**Hans and Daniel, “Strategic Responsibility: Rebalancing European and trans-Atlantic defense” Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strategic-responsibility-rebalancing-european-and-trans-atlantic-defense/> GDI-TM]

Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine and its efforts to upend Europe’s security order are the most vivid and dramatic evidence of this new era’s challenges. Until now, Putin’s pressures have united the Atlantic alliance. Unity could give way to discord, however, if Europeans don’t assume a stronger role in deterring/defending against Russia, with the capabilities to match, and if the United States continues to impede a European lead role in crisis management. It is time for the U.S. and Europe to shed their mutual ambivalence and work together to make strategic autonomy — defined as greater strategic responsibility — a win-win for both sides of the Atlantic.

### EDF good

#### EDF increases support for procurement and research in defense – creates integration and coordination among EU

**Retter, et al,** Senior Analyst and Deputy Director of the Centre for Defence Economics and Acquisition Rand Europe, **2021**

[Lucia“European strategic autonomy in defence” Rand Europe 2021 <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA1300/RRA1319-1/RAND_RRA1319-1.pdf> GDI-TM]

Finally, another important step in developing defence and military capabilities at the EU level has been the implementation of the European Defence Fund (EDF) that was created in 2017 to address collective shortages in defence procurement and research.80 Currently, EU member states each pursue their own capability development and acquisition programmes primarily on a national level, leading to fragmentation, duplication of effort, industrial inefficiencies and reduced interoperability. The EDF aims to pool member states’ resources to increase investment efficiency in defence capability. The EDF is significant because it is the first time that the EU budget will be used to fund defence activities explicitly, including defence research and co-funding capability development projects. The EDF uses existing budget lines within the EU budget to defence funding for the first time rather than asking for additional contributions from EU member states.81 According to the final funding plan that was laid out by the Commission, the budget will be split between defence research projects, and subsequently co-funded capability development projects between member states. However, their financial contributions will remain voluntary.82

## Answer to Answer blocks [for the neg]

### AT: EU lacks military capacity

#### NATO may be useful – but strong Europe good for alliances – and EU building capacity independent of NATO

**Solana,** Distinguished Fellow - Foreign Policy, **2022**

[Javier, “European security after NATO’s Madrid summit” Brookings June 24, 2022https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/24/european-security-after-natos-madrid-summit/ GDI-TM]

NATO has shown itself to be indispensable for Europe’s security and the best guarantee of their national security for a growing number of countries. One of the most important consequences of the war in Ukraine has been Finland and Sweden’s applications to join NATO — two countries with all the credentials to contribute positively to the alliance. Following Danish citizens’ recent decision to join the European Union’s defense policy, the institutions that form the basis of European security are becoming increasingly aligned. For decades, a false dichotomy between Europeanists and Atlanticists has fueled a sterile and unproductive security debate in Europe. Today, few doubt that Europeans must contribute more to the alliance and European security, and that they should develop the capacity to lead in future security crises. The question, therefore, is how Europe can best contribute to NATO’s mission. A strong Europe is indispensable for revitalizing the trans-Atlantic security bond. In one of my first meetings as EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, a former British chief of the defense staff pertinently described the direction this relationship should take. “A Europe that remains allied with the United States simply because of its own weakness,” he said, “is of limited value.” Strengthening the trans-Atlantic relationship implies recognizing that its European component has changed. The events of recent months have shown that the EU can respond to security threats in a coordinated and robust manner. Extensive sanctions against Russia, joint financing of arms supplies to Ukraine, and the mere idea of drastically reducing Europe’s dependence on Russian energy would have been unthinkable just a few years ago. The European response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, after the measures the continent adopted to mitigate the economic consequences of COVID-19, has confirmed that Europe becomes stronger in times of adversity. True, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggression has made it easier for Europe to unite. But its leaders’ ambition is noteworthy, given some of the measures’ economic costs to Europe. **The basis for advancing European defense integration already exists. Progress in the past 20 years in common security and defense policy, the experience of both civil and military EU missions, the work of the European Defense Agency, and the adoption of the Strategic Compass put Europe in a favorable position to confront the challenge.**